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EXPORT CONTROLS AFFECTING SPACE
OPERATIONS
ARTHUR M. DULA*
THE UNITED STATES exports across unfortified bor-
ders with Canada to the north and Mexico to the south.
The Atlantic and Pacific oceans provide avenues of trade
to our east and west. A new border has developed above
all United States territory. America now exports to space.
Despite twenty-eight years of space activity, hundreds
of space flights, and the expenditure of over three hun-
dred billion dollars on development of military and com-
mercial space assets,' the spacefaring nations have not
agreed on the boundaries of space.2 Under principles of
international law, the United States border with space lies
* Dula Shields & Egbert; member IISL; Past Chairman ABA Aerospace Law
Committee, ABA Science & Technology Section; Aerospace Counsel, Space Ser-
vices Inc. of America. The author wishes to express his gratitude to his associate,
Ann D. Ziegler, for her assistance in the preparation of this article.
I P.B. STARES, THE MILITARIZATION OF SPACE, U.S. POLICY, 1945-84, at 258-59
(Cornell University Press 1985).
2 The definition/delimitation of outer space and the controversy engendered
by that subject and the use of geostationary orbit positions are discussed in C.
CHRISTOL, THE MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OUTER SPACE 435-546
(1982)[hereinafter cited as CHRISTOL].
The Soviets disclosed their position that outer space consists of the region
above 100-110 kilometers altitude above sea level on Earth in a presentation by
G.P. Zhukov. See Zhukov, Delimitation of Outer Space, PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-
THIRD COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE (1981) [hereinafter cited as
Zhukov]. The various arguments for alternative definitions were discussed, but
Zhukov insisted that the upper altitude limit of State sovereignty must not depend
upon factual capacity of States to exercise an effective control on their air space up
to that latitude. The Soviets consider the delimitation between air space (which is
subject to State sovereignty through the Chicago Convention and Transit Agree-
ment) and outer space as fundamental to establishing a functional legal regime of
outer space. The orbital space of geostationary satellites and the right of space
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somewhere below the altitude where satellites may freely
orbit.3 According to an international treaty on space ac-
tivity, the United States has a duty to authorize, super-
vise, and bear international responsibility for the actions
of its corporations and citizens in outer space.4 In order
objects to pass through air space territory of other states for the purpose of reach-
ing outer space are inseparable parts of outer space as a whole. Id. at 221-22.
Under the Roman law, some things were deemed capable of private owner-
ship while others were considered by natural law to be common to all and not
subject to individual ownership. Air, running water, the sea, and the seashore
were among the things constituting common property. INST. JUST. 67 (T. Cooper
trans. 1812); 158 (T. Sanders trans. 1876). Et quidem naturalijure communia sunt
omnium haec, aer aqua profluens, mare et per hoc littora maris. INST. JUST. 67 (T. Cooper
trans. 1812); INST. JUST. (T. Sanders trans. 1876).
The concept that subjects incapable of division are thereby held in common was
illustrated by Gaius who contrasted "Ocean, air, and light, as physical subjects,
subjects incapable of appropriation, with the earth, a physical subject capable of
appropriation." Gaius considered ocean, air, and light to be res communes, mean-
ing items that are incapable of appropriation that are held in communism. GAIUS,
ELEMENTS OF ROMAN LAW, 152 (E. Poste, trans. 3rd ed. Oxford 1890). It should
be noted, however, that this maxim applies to those subjects incapable of being
appropriated for individual use, and not to subjects as to which individual appro-
priation would be undesirable. In United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946),
the Supreme Court stated that, although airspace is a public highway, a land-
owner's use and enjoyment of the land requires exclusive control of at least as
much space above the ground as he can occupy or use in connection with the
land. Id. at 264. The law protects the landowner from invasions of this space
even though he does not physically occupy or make use of this stratum in the
conventional sense. Id. at 265.
For a discussion of the same subject by a socialist writer, see GORBIEL, OUTER
SPACE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1981).
4 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and
Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, opened for
signature January 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [here-
inafter cited as The Outer Space Treaty].
The Outer Space Treaty consists of 17 articles. Article I provides that the explo-
ration and use of outer space should be for the benefit of all states, regardless of
the level of their economic or scientific development. Articles II and III require
that outer space, the moon, and other celestial bodies remain free from any claim
of national appropriation, whether by occupation or other means. Space explora-
tion is governed by international law, including the Charter of the United Nations.
Article IV prohibits the installation of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass de-
struction in outer space, on the moon, or on any celestial bodies. Article V pro-
vides that astronauts give all possible assistance to astronauts of other states while
conducting activities in outer space. Also, states must return astronauts who acci-
dentally land in their territory. Article VI provides that states bear international
responsibility for national activities in space, whether these activities are done by
governmental or nongovernmental entities. The Outer Space Treaty also re-
quires actions of nongovernmental entities in outer space to be authorized and
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to comply with this treaty, the United States maintains a
supervised by the state. Article VII places responsiblity for damage done by
spacecraft or component parts on the state that launces the spacecraft. Damage to
property or persons are compensable whether occuring on earth or in outerspace.
Also, in the event that the spacecraft launch was procured by a state other than the
location of the launch, the launcher and procurer are jointly liable. State jurisdic-
tion and control over spacecraft and personnel continues into space. Ownership is
not affected by travel into space or subsequent return to the earth. Article IX
requires states to confer before undertaking an activity in space that could harm
the earth or interfere with the actions of another state in space.
Installations and equipment in space are open to inspection on grounds of reci-
procity and reasonable notice. The Outer Space Treaty, supra this note. Unde-
fined phrases in the Outer Space Treaty give it a comfortable looseness that may
be an advantage as it evolves to meet the needs of future space activities. Terms
such as outer space, weapons of mass destruction, and others were not defined
and no interpretation of their meanings has been agreed on in the decade since
the Treaty's promulgation. Judicial interpretation may define these terms with
precision when the need for clarification becomes pressing. Future treaties may
provide better definitions. Careful legal analysis will be needed over the next few
decades to develop the issues affected by these definitions. The greatest limita-
tion of the Outer Space Treaty is that it was written and adopted by a multina-
tional committee. Thus it was intellectually forged out of high ideals rather than
pragmatically developed from previous experience. Additional problems arise as
a result of the provision regarding use, occupation, and national appropriation,
which attempts to fundamentally reverse traditional international law. Histori-
cally, occupation has always equalled national appropriation. In fact, eight equa-
torial nations, including Brazil, have claimed control of the part of space used by
communications satellites over their territory as a natural resource. Despite these
difficulties, the Outer Space Treaty is more concrete than the customary interna-
tional law from which it developed and it has served as a touchstone for the devel-
opment of more specific treaties.
Since 1967, the United States has acceded to three multinational treaties that
develop principles from The Outer Space Treaty into specific international law.
The first agreement reached in 1968 provided for the rescue and return of astro-
nauts. The First Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astro-
nauts, and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space, April 22, 1968, 19
U.S.T. 7570, T.I.A.S. 6599 [hereinafter cited as the Rescue and Return Treaty]. In
1972, the major space states agreed on a convention covering international liabil-
ity for damage caused by space objects. The convention established a standard of
unlimited absolute liability, requiring a launching state to pay compensation for
damage caused by its space object on the earth's surface or to an aircraft in flight.
If the damage is done in space or to another spacecraft, the launching state is
liable only if the damage is due to its fault or the fault of persons for whom it is
responsible. Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space
Objects, March 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, T.I.A.S. 7762.
The 1972 convention also establishes rules distributing liability among states
engaged in joint space ventures. Generally, each state is jointly and severally liable
for the entire amount. A one-year statute of limitations for presenting a claim
runs from the time of the damage or such time as the damage should have been
discovered had the damaged state exercised due diligence. Finally, the conven-
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national registry of space objects.5 Registered objects are
under United States jurisdiction and United States law
applies to them and their personnel.6 This demonstrates
the evolution of space law, which began as vague multina-
tional treaties and has developed into statutes enacted by
the United States Congress to govern specific areas of
space activity. 7 These statutes control the application of
tion outlines the procedure for presenting a claim and authorizes a claim commis-
sion. Only a nation may bring a claim under this convention. Id.
The 1976 Registration Convention provides a mechanism for registering a
space object on a national register. Convention on the Registration of Objects
Launched into Outer Space, opened for signature, January 14, 1975, 28 U.S.T. 695,
T.I.A.S. 8480. This is important to businesses because the national registration of
a space object, such as a space factory, determines which nation's law applies to
the object. Ifa space factory is enrolled on the United States' registry, then Amer-
ican laws and American courts have jurisdiction over the factory and all events
that transpire aboard it. Specifically, such a space object should be subject to
United States patent, antitrust, and tax law as well as all other federal statutes.
6 See Dula, Regulation of Private Commercial Space Activities, 23 JURIMETRICS J. 156
(1983). For a discussion of the law that will apply to activities conducted on the
United States space shuttle, see generally GOROVE, SPACE SHUTrLE AND THE LAW
(1980); DeSaussure, The iVew Era in Outer Space, 13 AKRON L.REv. 593 (1980);
Michener, The Role of Private Enterprise in Outer Space - International Legal Implica-
tions, 2 Hous. J. INT'L L. 1 (1979); SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE,
AND TRANSPORATION, 98TH CONG., 1St SESS., POLICY AND LEGAL ISSUES INVOLVED
IN THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF SPACE (Comm. Print 1983).
7 In the past, the major space States, particularly the United States and the So-
viet Union, have influenced, either by action or inaction, the development of in-
ternational space law at the United Nations. The General Assembly established
the Ad Hoc Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) in 1958.
COPUOS originally consisted of eighteen members including three Soviet bloc
states, namely, the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. The other commit-
tee members were Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, France, India,
Iran, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Poland, Sweden, the United Arab Republic (UAR), the
United Kingdom and the United States. The Soviet bloc refused to participate in
the early meetings becaue they considered COPOUS to be heavily weighed in
favor of the Western powers. India and the UAR boycotted the early meetings on
the ground that the committee could not usefully serve its purpose in the absence
of the Soviet Union. CHRISTOL, supra note 2, 14-15.
The adoption of General Assembly Resolution 1472 (XIV) of December 12,
1959, made COPUOS a permanent body of the General Assembly. Albania, Bul-
garia, Hungary, and Rumania of the socialist bloc and Austria and Lebanon were
added to the membership. The expanded membership included seven Soviet bloc
states and seventeen non-Soviet bloc states. Id. at 15.
The committee was again enlarged in 1961 when Chad, Mongolia, Morocco,
and Sierra Leone were added. The twenty-eight became thirty-seven on Decem-
ber 18, 1973, with the adoption of General Assembly Resolution 3182 (XXVIII).
Added as new members were Chile, the German Democratic Republic, the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany, Indonesia, Kenya, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sudan, and Vene-
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general treaty principles to United States business.8
zuela. Then, on December 20, 1977, the thirty-seven became forty-seven with the
adoption of General Assembly Resolution 32/196B. New members were Benin,
Colombia, Ecuador, Iraq, Netherlands, Niger, Philippines, Turkey, United Repub-
lic of Cameroon, and Yugoslavia. Id. Two facts stand out in the augmentation of
membership. First, the space resource states were joined by representatives of the
less developed countries. Second, the equatorial states received strong represen-
tation. With the admission of Nauru to the United Nations in 1976 there were
twelve equatorial states as members. Of these five, namely Brazil, Colombia, Ec-
uador, Indonesia, and Kenya are committee members. Congo, Gabon, Nauru,
Peru, Somalia, Uganda, and Zaire have not been appointed to the committee. Id.
at 16, 914 App. Since geostationary space objects find an orbital position above
the Equator to be congenial the named states have a particular interest in this
subject. Id. at 465-68.
There are currently fifty-three members of COPUOS, including: Albania, Ar-
gentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Benin, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chad, Chile,
China, Colombia, Czechoslovakia, Ecuador, Egypt, Federal Republic of Germany,
France, German Democratic Republic, Greece, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran,
Iraq, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Lebanon, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Netherlands, Ni-
ger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Poland, Rumania, Sierra Leone, Spain, Sudan,
Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United King-
dom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Cameroon,
United States of America, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, and Yu-
goslavia. Id. at 915 app.
The Outer Space Treaty requires that the United States government provide
authorization and supervision of space activities undertaken by business under
United States jurisdiction. The Outer Space Treaty, supra note 4, at Art. IV. The
United States has the right to determine the extent of authorization and supervi-
sion of business sponsored space activities.
Federal statutes and treaties are of equal authority. If there is a conflict be-
tween a statute and a treaty, the later-promulgated instrument controls. 87 C.J.S.
Treaties § 9 (Supp. 1985). Federal statutes and the regulations made under a treaty
control the activities of United States business in space, even to the extent of re-
voking any portion of an earlier international treaty that conflicts with the national
law.
Amendment X of the United States Constitution provides that powers not dele-
gated nor prohibited to the United States by the Constitution are reserved to the
states. In addition to treaties, federal statutes, and the regulations made under
them, the laws of the several states governing the regulation of business help de-
termine the United States authorization and supervision of private space activities.
Statutorally, Congress may repeal, supersede, or render the provisions of a treaty
ineffectual. The courts must construe the statute according to its manifest intent.
If there is a conflict and the legislation was passed later, the statute must be recog-
nized by the courts regardless of political consequences. DULA, Regulation of Pri-
vate Commercial Space Activities, PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-FOURTH COLLOQUIUM
ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE (1982) (citing Mosar v. United States, 341 U.S. 41
(1951); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893); Chae Chan Ping v.
United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889); Petition of Georgakopoulos, 81 F. Supp. 411
(E.D. Pa. 1948), petition dismissed, 85 F. Supp. 37 (E.D. Pa. 1949); and United States
ex rel Pfefer v. Bell, 248 F.Supp. 992 (E.D.N.Y. 1918). See also Dula, Private Sector
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OUTER SPACE ACTIVITY SUBJECTED TO EXPORT CONTROLS
On September 9, 1982, Space Services Incorporated, a
Texas corporation, launched the first privately owned ex-
pendable launch vehicle.9 The Conestoga I flew one hun-
dred and ninety-three miles into outer space."0 This
space object was the first to receive an export license from
the federal government. The State Department issued the
license under the authority of the Arms Export Control
Act." The license was subject to very strict limitations. 12
Activities in Outer Space, 19 INTL'L LAw. 159 (1985); and 87 C.J.S. Treaties § I (Supp.
1985).
0 For the Contestoga I launch in September 1982, Space Services Incorporated of
America (SSIA) requested an exemption from the Federal Aviation Administra-
tion (FAA) regulations permitting a sub-orbital launch with a splash-down in the
Gulf of Mexico. The exemption was granted after interagency consultation and
coordination. The FAA also issued an order designating temporary restricted air-
space and promulgated appropriate notices to airmen concerning the launch.
While NASA did not exercise any regulatory authority over the launch, NASA did
agree to provide a Minuteman I M56A- I rocket motor which powered the Conestoga
I rocket. As part of the process of deciding whether and how to permit the use of
the M56A-I rocket motor, NASA carefully reviewed the technical and safety as-
pects of the proposed Conestoga I launch. For a complete discussion of the Cones-
toga I launch see Dula, Private Section Activities in Outer Space, 19 INT'L LAW. 15a
(1985).
1o N. Y. Times, Sept. 10, 1982, at 1, col. 4.
11 22 U.S.C. §§ 2752-94 (1982).
12 The various treaties discussed above imposed obligations on the federal gov-
ernment but not directly on SSIA. The State Department exercised its responsi-
bilities under the treaties described above by requiring SSIA to obtain an export
license. The State Department exercised authority for control and licensing of
arms exports contained in the Arms Export Control Act. On April 16, 1982, SSIA
requested "any authorization necessary" from the State Department for the Con-
stestoga I launch. On September 7, 1982, the State Department issued a letter
approving the launch under the Arms Control Act, subject to the following condi-
tions and limitations;
1. The authorization was confined to the proposed prototype
launch only. Subsequent launches would require a seperate reveiw
and approval.
2. The authorization was based on the understanding that SSIA
agreed to comply with certain safety requirements imposed by
NASA and the FAA on the Conestoga launch.
3. The authorization was subject to the understanding that SSIA
had obtained insurance in the amount of $100 million for any dam-
ages or expenses that might arise in connection with the launch, in-
cluding any payments for which the United States may be
responsible under any treaty.
Letter from the United States State Department to Space Services Incorporated of
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The Commercial Space Launch Act of 1984 empowers
the Department of Transportation with licensing private,
commercial, expendable space vehicle launches.1 3 The
Secretary of Transportation is required to consult with
America (Sept. 7, 1982). See also Dula, supra note 8, at 77, for a list of the license
restrictions.
1- Commercial Space Launch Act of 1984, 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 2601, 2623 (Supp. II
1984) [hereinafter cited as the Space Launch Act]. The Act designated the Depart-
ment of Transportation (DOT) as the lead agency for private commercial
launches. The Act requires any person engaged in non-government launch oper-
ations in the United States to obtain a license pursuant to the terms, conditions,
rules, and requirements established by the Secretary of Transportation in consul-
tation with other federal agencies. Id. § 2606. United States citizens, defined in
Section 2603(8), engaged in non-government launch operations outside the
United States are required to be licensed. Id. § 2605. Government launch activi-
ties are exempt from the provisions of the Act. Id. § 2620(c).
In creating a one-stop licensing process within DOT for commercial space
launch activities, the Space Launch Act does not abrogate or repeal any exsisting
federal law or requirement. The Act does instruct the Secretary of Transportation
to consult other federal agencies whose existing authority applies to launch or
launch-operation activities. Id. § 2604. In conjunction with other agencies, the
Secretary may establish procedures that expedite the processing of applications
for commercial launch and launch operation licenses. The consultation require-
ment permits the Secretary and the involved federal agencies to revise and review
their regulations and procedures to eliminate launch operations. Agency consul-
tation should ensure that those regulations and procedures found essential are
administered as efficiently as possible. The Act is consistent with Exec. Order No.
12,465, 3 C.F.R. 163 (1984), reprinted in 42 U.S.C.A. § 2465 at 175-76 (1986).
The Space Launch Act is not meant to affect excising payload licensing author-
ity, particularly the authority of the FAA under the Communication Act of 1934,
47 U.S.C. §§ 5151-5610 (1982), or the authority of the Secretary of Commerce
under the Land Remote Sensing Commercialization Act of 1984, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 4201-4292 (Supp. I 1984). Pursuant to the Space Launch Act, the Secretary
of Transportation may neither require a recertification process nor review the ac-
tion of another agency to issue a payload license, authorization, or permit. The
Act does address payloads as an applicant must be able to receive a launch license.
Where a license, authorization, or permit is not required for a payload, the Secre-
tary is granted a broader authority to ensure that the payload does not jeopardize
public health and safety, safety of property, national security, or foreign policy
interests.
The Act authorizes the Secretary of Transportation to issue or transfer a license
for launch activities where activities are consistent with public health and safety,
safety of property, national security, and foreign policy interests and where neces-
sary payload licenses, authorizations, or permits have been obtained. The Secre-
tary may waive the application of any requirement for a license if the Secretary
determines that the waiver is in public interest and will not jeopardize the public
health and safety, safety of property, or any national security or foreign policy
interest. 49 U.S.C.A. § 2605 (Supp. 11 1984). To ensure adherence to this stan-
dard, the Secretary is instructed to notify the applicant of any pending issues after
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other federal agencies, including the Departments of
Commerce, Defense, and State, to establish procedures
for obtaining a commercial launch license. t4
The Act provides that payloads launched by a licensed
expendable vehicle are not exported.' 5  Recent regula-
tions require that these payloads be reviewed for national
security and foreign policy purposes.' 6 Thus, they are
subject to export control, but the standards for this con-
trol have not been defined. As of mid-1986 no payload
has been launched under a launch license.
The Act has a very narrow application. It does not ef-
fect the vast majority of international activitites required
to provide the goods, services, and technical data used to
design, build, and operate a commercial, multinational
space project. More critically, it fails to address the future
multinational activities that will be conducted by private
120 days. Id. § 2608. This requirement should allow adequate opportunity for the
applicant to provide necessary information resolving any outstanding issues.
The Act authorizes the Secretary of Transportation to suspend, revoke, or ter-
minate any license and/or launch activity immediately, unless otherwise specified.
Id. § 2609. If the Secretary finds that the licensee has substantially failed to com-
ply with any requirement of the Act, license, or regulation or if suspension is re-
quired to protect public health, property, or national security or foreign policy
interests, the Secretary may terminate launch proceedings. To determine compli-
ance with the license, the Secretary is permitted to place federal officers, employ-
ees, or other individuals, including contractor personnel, at any launch site,
production facility, or assembly site used by a contractor of the licensee. Id.
§ 2616.
By facilitating and encouraging the acquisition of government launch property
and government launch services by the private sector, the Act promotes commer-
cial space launches. The Secretary, in consultation with the Attorney General,
establishes a minimum level of liability insurance as a requirement for a license.
The Secretary may delegate enforcement authority to any officer or employee of
DOT or, with approval of another agency's head, any officer or employee of that
agency. The Secretary is required under the Act to consult with the State Depart-
ment, Department of Defense, and other appropriate federal agencies to carry out
the provisions of the Act. Id. § 2604. The Act preempts any state law, rules, regu-
lations, standards, or orders inconsistent with the Act. Id. § 2620. Reporting re-
quirements are found in § 2621 of the Act. The Act authorizes appropriations of
$4 million for the fiscal year 1985. Id. § 2623.
14 49 U.S.C. § 2604 (Supp. 11 1984).
- Id. at § 2620(b).
- Commercial Space Transportation Licensing Regulations, 51 Fed. Reg. 6870
(1986)(to be codified at 14 C.F.R. Ch. III).
EXPORT CONTROLS
business in space on a space station or other crewed
facility.
Legally, space is outside the United States. On the
other hand, space is not considered within the territory of
any other nation. Thus, goods manufactured, property
owned, and activities conducted in space are currently
considered to be outside the United States for tax, patent,
customs, and export purposes.
Commercial Space Activity
Outer space borders all nations. Thus, it is inherently
international. Corporations that do business in space are
therefore inherently multinational. While the end prod-
uct of their work is considered a space activity, the vast
majority of commercial space operations take place on
earth. Congress has declared that "activities in space
should be devoted to peaceful purposes for the benefit of
all mankind."' 7 This policy has, for decades, promoted a
strong sense of international cooperation in commercial
space activities. Multinational and international projects,
including communications, remote sensing, materials
processing, and scientific research have been the rule
rather than the exception.' 8
A period of rapid commercial space development has
begun.' 9 The routine access to space made possible by the
United States Space Transportation System (the Shuttle)
17 42 U.S.C. § 2451(a) (1958).
i8 International Cooperation and Competition in Civilian Space Activities, Of-
fice of Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress, Washington, D.C. OTA-ISC-239
(passim) (July 1985). See also Unispace/82, A Context for International Cooperation and
Competition (March 1983). This page report analyzes the international policy is-
sues discussed at last year's UNISPACE conference in Vienna, Austria. Confer-
ence topics included militarization of outer space, direct broadcasting by satellite,
remote sensing, geostationary orbit, transfer of technology, and the role of the
United Nations in space affairs. NASA has entered numerous bilateral agree-
ments for joint space projects. See Gorove, UNITED STATES SPACE LAw (1983). For
a view of international cooperation from the Soviet perspective, see V.S. Versher,
OPSUMER COMPYGRUREAMBA (1982) (Orbits of Cooperation in Russia).
- Civilian Space Stations and the US. Fnture in Space, Office of Technology Assess-
ment, (OTA-STI-241) (passim) (November 1984), [hereinafter cited as Civilian
Space Stations].
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and President Reagan's support for a permanently
manned space station has catalyzed this era. The Shuttle
and the space station programs actively seek international
participation .2  The first reuseable space laboratory,
"SPACELAB," is a multinational project of the European
Space Agency in cooperation with the National Aeronau-
tics and Space Administration of the United States.2 '
Other nations, including the Soviet Union, China, Japan,
and France (through the European Space Agency) have
announced that they intend to conduct commercial opera-
tions in space. 22 Their success on the space frontier will
lead to tens of billions of dollars in revenue projected
from commercial space activities in the future.23
All industrialized nations sell high technology commod-
ities and services on the international market to support
both their national space programs and the multinational
programs in which they participate.24 France has a na-
tional marketing organization, PROSPACE, specifically
oriented to the international sale of French aerospace
hardware and services.25 The Soviet Union has also
formed a marketing organization, GLAVCOSMOS, to sell
Soviet space goods and services. 26 The United States has
no similar international sales program. Its export rules
are far more complicated and more harsh than those of its
international competitors. As commercial space activities
2o Beggs, The Issue is Leadership, 23 AEROSPACE AMERICA 45, 57 (Sept. 1985).
21 COLLET & MELLORS, EUROPEAN INTEREST IN THE SPACE STATION 191 (1985).
22 Civilan Space Stations, supra note 19, at 33.
2 . The markets are estimated to be as follows: communications - $ 10-100 bil-
lion; remote sensing - $1 billion; materials and manufacturing - $20-40 billion;
and orbital transport - $4-6 billion. McDonnell Douglas Corp. marketing re-
ports. Charts, McDonnell Douglas - NASA Headquarters Studies, Pre-Phase B,
1983 Other studies estimate that the space-produced drug market will be $27 bil-
lion by 1995. See Houston Post, Aug. 30, 1984, at 3B. There will be a $30-35
billion benefit from remote sensing by 1995; see 1983 GAO ANN. REP. III.
21 See Civilian Space Stations, supra note 19, at 65.
2- See PROSPACE Catalog (1985).
26 Conversation between the author and Boris Majorski of the Soviet delegation
to the International Institute of Space Law, 28th Colloquium, Stockholm Sweden,
October 1, 1985.
become economically significant, export policies will be-
come a key competitive barrier to United States industry.
Today, multinational aerospace transactions are big
business for many countries. Due to the vision of govern-
ment and strong private investment during the develop-
ment of aeronautical technology, the United States is the
world leader in the sale of aircraft. The sale of aircraft,
including spare parts, support services, and aeronautical
technology, is a major source of positive trade payments
for the United States. The market for space goods and
services could quickly exceed the aeronautical market.
Many nations realize this fact and actively seek a place for
their industries on this frontier of capital investment and
profit. Each transaction contemplated by any United
States commercial organization, or individual, who would
sell aerospace goods, technology or services requires sev-
eral regulated export actions. First, data is exported to
allow a potential customer to evaluate the product. Then,
the service or commodity itself is exported. Later, spare
parts and technical improvements must be exported to al-
low the customer the benefit of his bargain.
Military Space Activity
Space has great military potential. Many strategic
weapons, such as ballistic missiles, operate at least par-
tially in space. All modern military establishments require
significant space assets for intelligence, command, con-
trol, and communications functions. Both the Soviet
Union and the United States spend the majority of their
space related funds on military projects.2 7 The high tech-
nology components of military space systems, such as sen-
sors, computers, and computer programs that operate
remote sensing, communication, and navigation satellites
constitute the critical military technology of the late 20th
century. The components of launch vehicles that trans-
port these spacecraft into orbit are the national munitions
27 See Civilian Space Stations, supra note 19, at 65.
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of the modern age. These components include items such
as rocket engines, high pressure/low temperature pumps,
and light-weight structural materials, together with the
computer programs and sophisticated test equipment that
are required to successfully design, test, evaluate, and
fabricate launch vehicles.
Current United States law views most space commerce,
including all sales of rockets, spacecraft, space electronics,
guidance systems, and related technical data and services,
as munitions and will license these items under strict re-
quirements of national security. Although some indus-
trial nations have virtually no formal export controls,
private space businesses in the United States will find
United States export controls pervasive and detailed.
Some commercial transactions will be licensed as ordinary
international trade, whose control is mitigated by recogni-
tion that United States industry must sell well in interna-
tional markets. Other transactions will be limited as
munitions under strict controls. Coping with these con-
trols will be critical to the success of any United States
commercial venture in space.
UNITED STATES EXPORT CONTROLS
Three mechanisms control exports from the United
States: 28 First, commodities and technical data on the
commodities control list are subject to the licensing re-
quirement of the Export Administration Act of 1979.29
Although this Act expired in 1983, its provisions were
reimposed under the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act.30 The Office of Export Administration
(OEA) of the Department of Commerce administers this
program of licensing under a series of detailed export ad-
28 Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (1982) (original
version at Ch. 11, § 3, 63 Stat. 7 (1949)).
'9 Id.
'o See Exec. Order No. 12,470, 3 C.F.R. 168 (1984); International Emergency
Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (1982).
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ministration regulations.3 Second, items on the United
States Munitions list, which includes computer programs
and many other items not traditionally thought of as
weapons, are subject to the licensing requirements of the
Arms Export Control Act3 2 administered by the Office of
Munitions Control (OMC) of the Department of State.
The State Department has considerable discretion in de-
termining whether a license will be issued in a particular
case under this Act. 4 Third, when a patent whose subject
matter is military technology is filed in the United States,
the application is inspected by both the Department of
Energy and the Department of Defense, either of which
may direct that the technology be kept secret. 5 This third
mechanism is beyond the scope of this article and will not
be discussed.
All of these requirements and restrictions apply to ex-
ports of space-related products, data, and services. How-
ever, any export license can be arbitrarily revoked or
restricted at any time after its issue. A change in national
security policies can have an uncontrollable adverse effect
on completed export transactions by imposition of
embargoes. 6
The OEA Requirements
The Export Administration Act of 1979 authorizes the
Department of Commerce to restrict exportation of cer-
tain controlled commodities. This duty is carried out by
the Office of Export Administration (OEA). The OEA re-
quires specific authorization for the export of any con-
trolled commodity or technical data to any destination
s, 15 C.F.R. §§ 368-399 (1985).
.2 Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 2751-2796(c)(1982).
- Id. § 2778.
34 22 C.F.R. § 123.7 (1985).
- 50 U.S.C. §§ 2401-2420 (1982).
• (; For a discussion of the 1982 retroactive embargo, see Comment, The Siberian
Pipeline Dispute and the Export Administration Act: What's Left of Extraterritorial Limits and
the Act of State Doctrine?, 6 Hous. J. INT'L L. 63 (1983).
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where controls are applicable. 7 The commodities that
are subject to controls are specified in the Commodity
Control List which is part of the Code of Federal Regula-
tions.3 8 Controlled technical data is defined as "informa-
tion of any kind that can be used, or adapted for use, in
the design, production, manufacture, utilization, or re-
construction of articles or materials."13 9 The data may be
tangible, such as a model, prototype, blueprint, or operat-
ing manual, or they may be intangible, such as technical
service.40 The export of this technical data means either
"(i) actual shipment or transmission of technical data out
of the United States; (ii) any release of technical data in
the United States with the knowledge or intent that the
data will be shipped or transmitted from the United States
to a foreign country; or (iii) any release of technical data
of U.S. origin in a foreign country.4 The release of tech-
nical data specifically includes "[v]isual inspection by for-
eign nationals of U.S. origin equipment and facilities;" or
"[o]ral exchanges of information in the United States or
abroad ... 42
For purposes of administering this licensing program,
the nations of the world have been divided into seven
country groups. There are varying licensing require-
ments and policies with respect to the different coun-
tries.43 The countries are grouped as follows: Country
Group T includes North, South, and Central America,
and the nations of the Caribbean (except Cuba); Country
Group V includes Western Europe, the Middle East, Af-
rica, noncommunist Asia, Australia, New Zealand, and the
People's Republic of China (with some restrictions);
Country Group Q consists of Romania; Country Group S
.17 15 C.F.R. §§ 372.1-.13 (1985).
-' Id. § 399.1.
-11 Id. § 379.1 (a) Note that this does not apply to "classified technical data". Id.
§ 379.1 (a) n.2.
40 Id. § 279.1 (a).
4, Id. § 379.1(b)(1).
42 Id. § 379.1(b)(2).
41 Id. § 370 (Supp. 1 1985).
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consists of Libya; Country Group W includes Poland and
Hungary; Country Group Y includes the Soviet Union,
the communist countries of Eastern Europe, Laos, and
Outer Mongolia; and Country Group Z includes Cuba,
Kampuchea, North Korea, and Vietnam.44
Controlled Commodities
Generally, commodities subject to export controls for
national security reasons (generally, the items identified
by the code letters "A" and "B" in the Commodity Con-
trol List) require a validated export license for export to
any destination, except Canada.45 However, the OEA
uses a diversion test to decide whether or not an export
license will be issued for controlled commodities destined
for Country Groups S, T and V. In granting or denying
applications for exports of controlled commodities to
Country Groups T and V, the OEA decides if there is a
significant risk that the commodities will be diverted from
their destination to a potentially hostile country. There is
particular concern over diversion to Country Groups Q
S, W, Y, and Z.46
The OEA reviews applications for exports of controlled
commodities to-destinations in Country Groups Q S, W,
and Y under a military potential test. This test is based on
whether the commodities may make a significant contribu-
tion to the military potential of the country of destination.
The nations of Country Group Z are subject to an abso-
lute embargo.47
The Export Administration Regulations (EARs) estab-
lish a series of general export licenses that permit the ex-
port of United States commodities to some or all
destinations without a specific validated export license.48
Among these export general licenses is the general li-
44 Id.
4- Id. § 399.1.
4 Id. §§ 371(c)(5), 379.4(f).
47 Id. § 370 (Supp. 1 1985), 50 U.S.C. § 2403(a) (1979).
4 15 C.F.R. § 371 (1985).
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cense GLV, which permits the export of controlled com-
modities in limited amount (generally, in values of $1,000
or less) to destinations in Country Groups T and V.49
The Commodity Control List specifies a general license
GLV maximum value for each entry. This value limit is
$100, $250, $500, or $1,000, depending upon the particu-
lar commodity.5 ° Certain commodities, however, which
are controlled for nuclear nonproliferation reasons, have
a general license GLV value limit of zero for all
5'destinations.
To facilitate multiple export transactions involving
commodities for which a validated license is required, the
EARs create a series of special licensing procedures.
These procedures are used under certain specified condi-
tions and in limited circumstances in lieu of individual val-
idated export licenses.52 Of these special licensing
procedures, the most important is the distribution license.
The distribution license permits the exporter to make re-
peated exports, over a period of one year (subject to re-
newal for up to two years), of controlled commodities to
approved consignees in specified destinations, pursuant
to an international marketing program.
53
The Peoples Republic of China is excluded from the list
of eligible countries under the distribution license proce-
dure.54 This restriction is consistent with the Office of Ex-
port Administration's policy of examining proposed
exports of controlled commodities to China on a case-by-
case basis.
The United States participates in a program of multina-
tional export control with Belgium, Canada, Denmark,
France, West Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Luxem-
bourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Turkey, and
41, Id. § 371.5(1).
- Id. § 399.1 (Supp. 1 1985).
.,, Id. § 378.2, 370.1 (Supp. 3 1985). and 399.1 (Supp. 1 1985).
.12 Id. § 373.
.- See id. § 373.3.
'4 Id. § 373.3(a)(ii).
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the United Kingdom. 55 This system of multinational con-
trols is administered by an informal Coordinating Com-
mittee ("COCOM") which reviews proposed exports of
multilaterally controlled commodities (commodities iden-
tified by the code letter "A" on the Commodity Control
List) to consignees in the communist countries of eastern
Europe, the Soviet Union, and the People's Republic of
China. Thus, after the Office of Export Administration de-
cides to grant a validated license for a proposed export of
an "A" item to one of these destinations, the license ap-
plication must be reviewed and approved by COCOM
before the validated license will be issued.56
Technical Data
The EARs control the export of commodities and tech-
nical data. 57 Most technical data, except data having cer-
tain direct strategic applications, may be exported to
destinations in Country Groups T and V, except Afghani-
stan, under a general license.58 Strategic technical data
relating to the production and delivery of nuclear weap-
ons, airborne navigation, guidance systems, and civil air-
craft require a validated export license. 59 Thus, an
exporter proposing to export or license its technology to
an end-user in a country in Group T or V generally may
make the export without a validated export license. How-
ever, it may be necessary to obtain a letter of assurance
from the end-user that neither the technical data nor the
direct product thereof will be reported to a controlled
destination.60
In contrast, a validated export license has been re-
quired for almost all proposed exports of technical data to
destinations in Country Groups Q S, W, Y and Z, as well
- 50 U.S.C. § 2404(i) (1982).
5r Id.
57 15 C.F.R. § 379 (1985).
" Id. § 379.4(b).
59 id. § 379.5.
- Id. § 379.3.
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as Afghanistan. 6l A general license may only be utilized
for technical data exports to destinations in country
Groups Q W, or Y, or Afghanistan, when it consists of:
(a) manuals, instruction sheets or blueprints which are (i)
sent as part of a transaction involving, and are directly re-
lated to, a commodity licensed for export to the specific
destination and consignee, (ii) sent no later than one year
after shipment of the commodity,(iii) generally delivered
with the commodity as a matter of established business
practice, (iv) necessary for the assembly, installation,
maintenance, repair or operation of the commodity, and
(v) not related to production, manufacture or construc-
tion of the commodity; or (b) technical data supporting an
actual quotation, bid or offer to sell the commodity, pro-
vided that, (i) the commodity is not identified as an "A"
item on the Commodity Control List and subject to multi-
lateral controls, and (ii) the technical data do not disclose
the detailed design production, manufacture or means of
reconstruction of the quoted commodity or its product.62
OMC Requirements
The Arms Export Control Act authorizes the President
to "control the import and export of defense articles and
defense services" and to designate a Munitions List. 63
The President delegated the export control functions of
the Act to the Secretary of State.64 The State Department
established an Office of Munitions Control (OMC) to ad-
minister regulations under the Act. These are the Inter-
national Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR).65 Rockets, 66
spacecraft, 67 space electronics"8  and guidance equip-
-1 Id. § 379.5.
62 Id. § 379.4(b).
63 22 U.S.C. § 2778 (1982).
Exec. Order No. 11,958, 3 C.F.R. 79 (1978), reprinted in U.S.C. § 2751 app. at
604-05 (1982).
. 22 C.F.R. §§ 121-130 (1985).
66 22 C.F.R. § 121.1(b), category IV(a), (h); see also id. §§ 121.5, 121.11.
67 Id. § 121.1(b), category VIII; see also id. § 121.3.
6- Id. § 121.1(b), category XI.
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ment 69 are specifically included in the Munitions List
under the ITAR. Exporters must obtain licenses for the
export of any item on the Munitions List.7"
"Defense services" include the furnishing of assistance
to foreigners "in the design, engineering, development,
production, processing, manufacturing, use, operation,
overhaul, repair, maintenance, modification or recon-
struction of defense articles."'7 Defense services also in-
clude the furnishing to foreigners of any technical data,
whether in the United States or abroad.72 Technical data
include not only classified information relating to defense
articles and defense services, but also "information which
is directly related to the design, engineering, develop-
ment, production, processing, manufacturing, use, opera-
tion, overhaul, repair, maintenance, modification or
reconstruction of defense articles. This includes, for ex-
ample information in the form of blueprints, drawings,
photographs, plans, constructions, computer software
and documentation. 73
An export under the ITARs does not necessarily have
to cross a border (i.e., the border of space). For example,
an export occurs when a space commercialization corpo-
ration discloses technical data concerning its spacecraft or
its rocket to a potential foreign customer, even if both the
giver and the receiver of the data are located in the United
States.4 If a space business expects to export rockets or
spacecraft, either by selling them to foreigners, or, by
launching into space, the company must register with the
Office of Munitions Control. 75 Registration can be for a
period of one to five years. There is a sliding scale of
fees.76
6.9 Id. § 121.1(b), category XII.
7o 22 U.S.C. § 2278(b) (1982).
7 22 C.F.R. § 120.8; See also 22 U.S.C. § 2794(4), (5), (7) (1982).
72 22 C.F.R. 120.8; See also 22 U.S.C. § 2794(4), (5), (7) (1982).
7., 22 C.F.R. § 120.12(a) (b).
74 Id. § 120.10(d).
7-1 Id. § 122.10(d).
76 Id. § 122.2(a).
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Under the ITARs, most of the equipment used by a
commercial space organization, such as rockets and space-
craft, would be considered significant military equip-
ment. 77  When a company makes a proposal or
presentation for the sale of significant military equipment
in an amount of more than $14 million to countries other
than Australia, Japan, New Zealand, or a member of
NATO, the presentation must be approved in advance by
the Office of Munitions Control. 78 Failure to seek prior
approval can lead to the rejection of a subsequently filed
export license application. 79 Consequently, the export li-
censing of rockets and spacecraft under the ITARs must,
for all practical purposes, be accomplished by a United
States citizen, whether they are a national or permanent
resident.8" The purchaser must then identify himself and
the foreign consignee must then execute a "non-transfer
end use certificate" if purchasing significant military
equipment. Significant military equipment would include
a rocket or spacecraft worth more than $14 million. 8' The
Office of Munitions Control can request such a statement
for the export of any other article or service covered
under the ITARs.8 2 The sale of spacecraft or rockets for
an amount greater than $14 million is subject to congres-
sional review.8 3 The Office of Munitions Control pres-
ently treats this review as a thirty (30) day waiting period.
If Congress does not forbid the export within 30 days, the
State Department can issue the license.84
A number of arguments can be made that the ITAR's
control of the export of unclassified military technical data
violates the First Amendment right of free speech. 85 The
77 See id. § 120.19(a).
78 Id. § 126.8(a), (g).
79 Id. § 126.8(e).
o Id. § 123.1(b).
8' Id. §§ 120.19, 123.10(a), (c).
82 Id.
8 Id. § 123.10(e).
84 Id.
85 See, e.g., Hirschorn, The Revised Arms Export Control Regulations, 19 INT'L LAW.
675 (1985); Cheh, Government Control of Private Ideas - Striking A Balance Between
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State Department has imposed four limitations on the
control of technical data by ITAR. First, the technical
data must be significantly and directly related to specific
articles on the Munitions List.8 6 Second, information on
new developments is regulated only if that information
advances the state of the art of articles on the United
States Munitions List.8 7 Third, the ITARs specifically reg-
ulate information concerning general scientific, mathe-
matical, or engineering principles.8 8 Finally, disclosure by
an academic institution in the United States is not regu-
lated by the ITARs if made to a bonafide and full-time
employee whose permanent abode is in the United States
and who is not a national of a communist country." This
limitation is only available if the foreign national has been
advised in writing that he may not transfer the data to
other foreigners without the approval of the Office of
Munitions Control.90
If taken literally, these regulations require that any in-
formation about a rocket or a spacecraft given by an
American aerospace company to a foreigner requires de-
termination of whether or not a license is required prior
to disclosure. Even if such a license is not required (and
this would only be true in a small minority of cases), the
prohibitions against disclosure make it difficult for an
American aerospace company to sell its products or serv-
ices to foreign customers.
Scientific Freedom andNationalSecurity, 23JURIMETRICSJ. 1, 3-10 (1982); Greenstein,
National Security Controls on Scientific Information, 23 JURIMETRICS J. 50, 76-82 (1982);
United States v. Eidler Indust., Inc., 579 F.2d 516 (9th Cir. 1978); The Government's
Classification of Private Ideas: Hearings Before A Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Govern-
ment Operations, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 268-84 (1980); (Dept. of Justice memoran-
dum expressing concerns about constitutionality of ITAR technical data
restrictions).
- 22 C.F.R. § 120.21(c).
7 Id. § 120.22(c).
8 Id.
89 Id.
i, Id. § 125.4(b)(10).
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CONCLUSION
Why are these policies so crucial? Why not just reas-
sure the Department of Commerce or State that the pro-
posed transfers are for "good" purposes and that the data
and/or goods that aerospace companies must transfer to
do business will not go to any "bad" users?
The basic premise of United States technology transfer
policy and regulation is simple. Virtually any "goods,"
"data," or "services" moved in any way, for any reason,
for any length of time, to a person anywhere outside the
physical boundaries of the United States, is an export.
Even an oral discussion of technical information with a
foreign national within the United State may be consid-
ered an export. Therefore, technology, whether physical
or verbal, must comply with the export licensing proce-
dures. For example, sending a United States based engi-
neer to repair a satellite communications system is
probably not an export, provided he takes no tools or
documents with him. On the other hand, sending a copy
of corrected engineering drawings by satellite from an of-
fice in Houston to an American owned office outside
Paris, France probably is an export within the regulations.
Movement of data may qualify as "goods." Even inviting
a foreign national to work in a corporate laboratory to de-
velop new products or research for new data may fall
within the general control of export regulations. This is
of particular concern to companies planning commercial
space research because American and foreign researchers
will likely work together in space to discover the funda-
mental technical processes to be used in future space
manufacturing and materials processing. Under current
law, such work could be considered a series of exports of
technical data and thus could require licensing under the
strict letter of the current regime.
The policy of the United States government toward re-
coupment of technical data emphasizes protection. This
protectionism has developed at the expense of private
commercial entities which must sell products and research
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to maintain their market positions in an international
field. For example, in 1983, Space Services Incorporated
of America, the first private American firm to market a pri-
vate commercial launch vehicle, put together a small
brochure describing the potential performance of its Con-
nestoga launch vehicles.9 This brochure contained infor-
mation that was widely published and available to any
interested member of the public with a knowledge of col-
lege physics. After the company used this brochure to
promote and sell its launch services, the State Department
objected to a table of payload weights included with the
document. The brochure was subjected to rigorous State
Department review under export licensing regulations
before it could be released to foreign nationals or sent
overseas. The State Department finally allowed the
brochure to be distributed, but only to specifically named
countries and only for a limited period of time. This ac-
tion by the State Department prohibiting the release of
publicly available information by a commercial space cor-
poration in the United States had a chilling effect on the
company's international marketing efforts. The company
simply had no way of knowing what information it could
legally release to answer the inevitable questions of its po-
tential foreign customers.
The basic concern of export policy is national security.
In a cogent article discussing proposed changes in United
States export policy, Roland W. Schmitt of General Elec-
tric's Research and Development Center stated:
The proposed new tightening of the export administration
regulation to control unclassified technical data exports
would require a validated license for millions of routine
transactions. This would place a burden of catastrophic
proportions on research and technology-based institu-
tions. Technical data involving sales proposals, the use of
foreign consultants, technical discussions, remote com-
puter services, and data basis - all such interactions with
91 For a discussion of the Conestoga I launch, see supra note 13 and accompanying
text.
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people of allied and friendly nations would require gov-
ernment approval .... The current impasse centers on a
vital issue: whether the gain in security offered by tight-
ened restrictions on trade with allies and neutral parties is
worth more to the United States than the economic penal-
ties resulting from lost trade, lost technical contacts with
the rest of the world, while weakening scientific and engi-
neering creativity, which is at the heart of both our eco-
nomic and our military strength. 2
The solution to this dilemma is straightforward. First,
all activities occurring within the jurisdiction of the
United States in space on facilities launched by United
States registry space vehicles should be considered to be
within the United States for legal purposes. This would
render moot the problem of export regulation, because
there would be no export in most cases even for multina-
tional work done on United States space stations. A sim-
ple federal statute can accomplish this. Second, the
United States must realize that technology is not static.
Technological evolution continues. Further, technology
cannot be used and hidden at the same time. In my opin-
ion, our best chance for true security lies in allowing rapid
exchange of ideas and products between the free nations
of the West. The West must stay ahead in the race to de-
velop the resources and potential uses of space for the
benefit of all humanity. This race cannot be won if the
West copies the paranoid secrecy of its despotic oppo-
nents. As Kipling put it so well:
They copied all they could follow, But they couldn't copy my mind,
And I left them sweating and stealing a year and a half behind. 9
!, Schmitt, Export Controls: Balancing Technological Innovation and National Security,
FALL ISSUES IN SCI. & TECH. 119 (1984).
t,:, R. Kipling, The 1lany Gloster, in RUDYARD KIPLING'S VERSE (Inclusive Ed.
1922).
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